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ABSTRACT

Mobile devices have been growing more and more powerful in recent decades,
evolving from a simple device for SMS messages and phone calls to a smart device that
can install third party apps. People are becoming more heavily reliant on their mobile
devices. Due to this increase in usage, security threats to mobile applications are also
growing explosively. Mobile app flaws and security defects can provide opportunities for
hackers to break into them and access sensitive information. Defensive coding needs to
be an integral part of coding practices to improve the security of our code.
We need to consider data protection earlier, to verify security early in the
development lifecycle, rather than fixing the security holes after malicious attacks and
data leaks take place. Early elimination of known security vulnerabilities will help us
increase the security of our software, reduce the vulnerabilities in the programs, and
mitigate the consequences and damage caused by potential malicious attacks.
However, many software developer professionals lack the necessary security
knowledge and skills at the development stage, and secure mobile software development
is not yet well represented in most schools' computing curriculum.
In this paper, we present a static security analysis approach with the
FindSecurityBugs plugin for Android secure mobile software development based on
OWASP mobile security recommendations to promote secure mobile software
development education and meet the emerging industrial and educational needs.
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CHAPTER I
Introduction
Nowadays, people access the Internet through portable devices, like cellular phones
and tablets, as the client device rather than a PC or a laptop. Meanwhile, with new
development technologies and increasing hardware performance, mobile devices can
now easily implement functionalities that could only be implemented by PCs in the past.
Mobile devices facilitate people to access information and resources through the
Internet, wherever they are, whenever they need to, but this sort of lifestyle may cause
potential security crisis. [1] Moreover, mobile application vulnerabilities usually come
from unsecured code, which is one of the most significant reasons that causes security
issues.
Accompany with growth of the mobile application development industry in this
information age, hundreds of thousands of application developers dive into this field.
But unfortunately, a lot of developers have not been adequately trained in writing secure
code, which may cause flaws to exist inside applications. Also due to weakness may
breach applications’ confidentiality, integrity and availability from attacks. [3]
Another reason for the prevalence of unsecure programs is that sometimes coding
errors are unavoidable, even for well-trained developers, especially in situations where
managers or team leaders give priority to a multitude of other issues, such as deadlines,
functional requirements, performance, etc. [2]
Detecting and mitigating security flaws as early as possible in the secure software
development lifecycle (SDLC) is extremely important. One of the tools that can help
quickly and automatically check for security flaws without executing the code is static
code analysis (SCA). It helps developers to identify security vulnerabilities that can be
hard to discover manually due to the lack of security threat awareness, knowledge, and
skills. SCA performs code review with white-box testing and is carried out at the
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implementation phase of a security development lifecycle (SDL) to provide developers
with immediate feedback on possible security vulnerabilities. It can also significantly
reduce the cost of ‘test-patch-retest’ [4, 5, 6].
SCA is expected to automatically find security flaws with a high certainty of
confidence to make sure that what is found is indeed a flaw. However, it is difficult to
'prove' that an identified security flaw is an actual vulnerability. SCA can only find a
small portion of security flaws because new security flaws are growing dynamically.
In addition, SCA may produce false positive results where it reports a possible security
flaw that, in fact, is not a security flaw because of lacking application context in terms of
input and output contexts.
SCA can also result in false negative results where a flaw exists, but the tool fails to
report it. This may occur if a new flaw is not detected by the SCA tool.
Our research goal has two-folds.


Design and develop more flaw detectors to increase the confidence of
FindSecurityBugs SCA.



Enhance the effectiveness of SCA [9] with prevention solution to the discovered
flaw recommendation rather than reminding only.

Current tools that support secure programming either come from vendors or research
communities. The main objective of these tools is to check for security flaws after the
code is written. The general process is that developers need to install security analysis
tools first, then run the tools and scan code files. This means the examination usually
happens at the end of the development life circle. These tools and methods do help to
improve the quality of program. Our idea about secure programming concerns are that
to provide an approach which integrate unsecure code checking job during development
process inside popular IDEs. In other words, it is similar to spell and grammar check, the
whole scanning process could be executed under IDE environment.
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In this paper, we present a static security analysis approach with FindSecurityBugs
plugin for Android secure mobile software development based on OWASP mobile
security recommendations to promote secure mobile software development education
and meet the emerging industrial and educational needs.
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CHAPTER II
Background
This chapter briefly introduces some basic theoretical conceptions, and it starts with
an overview of Android and then briefly describes static analysis.

2.1 Android Overview
Android is an open-source, customizable mobile operating system created by Google
for use on touchscreen devices. It is the most popular operating system in use today.
While mainly installed on smartphones, it is also used on other smart devices, such as
TVs and watches.
Android apps can be written using Kotlin, Java, and C++ languages and are compiled
to a Dalvik bytecode using the Android Software Development Toolkit (SDK). Then the
Android SDK tools build your code along with any data and resource files into an APK,
an Android package, which is an archive file with an .apk suffix. One APK file contains all
the contents of an Android app and is the file that Android-powered devices use to install
the app. Each Android application acts in its own security sandbox, which isolates apps
from each other and prevents them from accessing each other's private data.
Because each app runs in a process sandbox, apps must explicitly share resources and
data by declaring the permissions they need to access shared resources and data outside
the sandbox. However, Android does not completely separate apps from each other,
because apps often need to share data. For example, assume a user wants to share a
photo with her friends using a social networking app. This process requires data to be
delivered across isolated (sandboxed) applications.

2.1.1 Intent
Android provides a sophisticated message dispatch system, in which Intents are used
to contact applications. An Intent is a message that contain the information of a recipient
and optionally includes other data; an Intent can be thought of as a self-contained object
that specifies a remote procedure to invoke and includes the associated arguments [19].

4

Applications use Intents for both inter-application communication and intra-application
communication. Additionally, Android OS sends Intents to applications as event
notifications. Some of these event notifications are system-wide events that can only be
sent by the operating system. We call these messages system broadcast Intents.
Intents can be used for explicit or implicit communication. An explicit Intent specifies
that it should be delivered to a particular application specified by the Intent, whereas an
implicit Intent requests delivery to any application that supports a desired operation. In
other words, an explicit Intent identifies the intended recipient by name, whereas an
implicit Intent leaves it up to the Android platform to determine which application(s)
should receive the Intent. For example, consider an application that stores contact
information. When the user clicks on a contact's street address, the contacts application
needs to ask another application to display a map of that location. To achieve this, the
contacts application could send an explicit Intent directly to Google Maps, or it could
send an implicit Intent that would be delivered to any application that says it provides
mapping functionality (e.g., Yahoo! Maps or Bing Maps). Using an explicit Intent
guarantees that the Intent is delivered to the intended recipient, whereas implicit Intents
allow for late runtime binding between different applications.

2.1.2 App components
Intents are delivered to application components, which are logical application
building blocks. Android defines four types of components:


Activities provide user interfaces. Activities are started with Intents, and they
can return data to their invoking components upon completion. All visible
portions of applications are Activities.



Services run in the background and do not interact with the user. Downloading
a file or decompressing an archive are examples of operations that may take
place in a Service. Other components can bind to a Service, which lets the
binder invoke methods that are declared in the target Service's interface.
Intents are used to start and bind to Services.
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Broadcast Receivers receive Intents sent to multiple applications. Receivers are
triggered by the receipt of an appropriate Intent and then run in the
background to handle the event. Receivers are typically short-lived; they often
relay messages to Activities or Services. There are three types of broadcast
Intents: normal, sticky, and ordered. Normal broadcasts are sent to all
registered Receivers at once, and then they disappear. Ordered broadcasts are
delivered to one Receiver at a time; also, any Receiver in the delivery chain of
an ordered broadcast can stop its propagation. Broadcast Receivers have the
ability to set their priority level for receiving ordered broadcasts. Sticky
broadcasts remain accessible after they have been delivered and are rebroadcast to future Receivers.



Content Providers are databases addressable by their application-defined URIs.
They are used for both persistent internal data storage and as a mechanism for
sharing information between applications.

Intents can be passed between three of the four components: Activities, Services, and
Broadcast Receivers. Intents can be used to start Activities; start, stop, and bind
Services; and broadcast information to Broadcast Receivers. All of these forms of
communication can be used with either explicit or implicit Intents. By default, a
component receives only internal application Intents (and is therefore not externally
invocable).

2.2 Related Work
Many works have been made to improve the secure software development education
in recent years. UNCC has designed and developed an Application Security IDE (ASIDE)
plug-in for Eclipse that notifies programmers of potential vulnerabilities in the code and
assists them to handle those vulnerabilities. The program is designed to enhance student
awareness and understanding of security vulnerabilities in processing of development
and increasing utilization of secure programming techniques in programming. ASIDE is
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used in a range of programming courses, from CS1 to advanced Web programming.
ASIDE addresses input validation vulnerabilities, output encoding, authentication and
authorization, and several race condition vulnerabilities [11-13]. ASIDE can only work in
the Eclipse IDE for Java and cannot support the Android IDE. Many instructors and
professors have integrated mobile application developments in their curriculums. Yuan
and others [14] reviewed current efforts and resources in secure software engineering
education, and provided related programs, courses, learning modules, hands-on lab
modules. Chi [15] built learning modules for teaching secure coding practices to
students. Those learning modules will provide the essential and fundamental skills to
programmers and application developers in secure programming. The IAS Defensive
Programming knowledge areas (KA) have been identified as topics/materials in the
ACM/IEEE Computer Science Curricula 2013 that can be taught to beginning
programmers in CS0/CS1 courses [16-17]. All these works mainly focus on the mobile
application development. They successfully disseminated the mobile computing
education but did not emphasize the importance of secure mobile software development
in their teachings.

2.3 Static Analysis
Static analysis, also called static code analysis, is a method of examining the code
without executing the program. It is usually performed as part of a code review (also
known as white-box testing) and is carried out at the implementation phase of a Security
Development Lifecycle (SDL). Static code analysis commonly refers to examining all
possible execution paths in the program, and it attempts to highlight possible
vulnerabilities within 'static' (non-running) source code by using techniques such as
taint analysis and data flow analysis. However, static analysis can only provide useful
results by approximating some facets of the actual execution of a program [10].
The process provides an understanding of the code structure and can help to ensure
that the code adheres to industry standards. Automated tools can assist programmers
and developers in carrying out static analysis. The process of scrutinizing code by visual

7

inspection alone (by looking at a printout, for example), without the assistance of
automated

tools,

is

sometimes

called

program

understanding

or

program

comprehension.

Android OS

Application

source

Component 1

Component 2

startActivity()

getIntent()

onActivity()

setResult()

sink

Figure 2.1: Interaction between components in the running example
One method to implement static analysis is utilizing and analyzing the data flow. Taint
analysis is one sort of data-flow analysis that tracks data along the program execution
process. In this method, sensitive data is marked with a taint at the source, and this taint
is allowed to propagate further through all program execution processes. Receiving this
taint at predefined sinks is used to create a flow which can be used to detect sensitive
data leaks from source to sink.
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CHAPTER III
FindSecurityBugs and Implementation
FindSecurityBugs (FSB) is a static code analysis plugin for the FindBugs (a plugin for
IntelliJ API). It is also the medium of our approach to prompting and helping
programmers to improve their practices. Our approaches based on some design
considerations.

3.1 FindSecurityBugs in IDE
FSB specializes in finding security issues in Java code by searching for security. It can
be used to scan Java applications, Android applications, and Scala applications. Since it
analyzes at the bytecode level to find defects and/or suspicious code, source code is not
mandatory for the analysis. It helps to prevent potential security flaws from released
software. Moreover, it allows us to design our own custom flaw detectors to find and
report the emerging security threats such that many flaws can be detected during the
software development phase with immediate feedback to the developer, rather than
finding vulnerabilities much later in the development cycle.
As security threats are constantly changing, vulnerability detections must also be
continuously updated. FSB allows developers to design custom security vulnerability
detectors. We have designed and developed a number of new security flaw detectors with
the FindSecurityBugs plug-in for Android mobile software development based on most
current OWASP 2017 top 10 mobile vulnerability to increase the security vulnerability
check coverage.
As we know that the most effective way to prevent developers to write insecure code is
to get start at the beginning of programming process or as early in the software
development lifecycle as possible. This means that integrating secure programming
process to programmers’ IDE is one of best options, since programmers and developers
can figure out vulnerabilities while coding.

9

Another consideration is the flexibility of FindSecurityBugs. Since potential
vulnerabilities either come from human factors, such as less efficient knowledge or flaws
hidden in APIs. Although developers spend considerable amounts of time and energy,
bugs and logic mistakes cannot be avoided completely. With complex circumstances,
situations get worse. In order to keeping an eye on new-found flaws or vulnerabilities,
the expansibility is an important issue to consider. Equally, when a new release or new
patch comes out, previous flaws of API may be fixed, so it should be handy to eliminate
scan scope to save performance. Also, there is another situation: you introduced
FindSecurityBugs to your team and have been running it as a part of your hourly/nightly
build process. As the team becomes more familiar with the tool, you have decided that
some of the bugs being detected are not important to your team, for whatever reason, or
you want to pay attention to specific vulnerabilities, then the exclude and include filters
would be useful.
Lastly, the reminder tool is an effective way that either helps developers to learn
secure programming practices or reinforces developers’ secure programming training.
Meanwhile, the structure of FindSecurityBugs should keep the relationship among
components low coupling since once existing information of vulnerabilities is changed or
updated, the content should be easy to update and without the need to modify other files.

Figure 3.1 Architecture of FindSecurityBugs’ framework

3.2 Flaws and Solution
FindSecurityBugs is a plugin for FindBugs that runs checks for most patterns that
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relate to OWASP TOP 10 vulnerabilities, from different types of injection and XSS
protection to sensitive data exposure and validation.
FindSecurityBugs first needs to detect for potential vulnerabilities in the source code,
and then provide programmers with information and possible solutions for the
vulnerabilities. Thus, to be effective, FindSecurityBugs needs to have a certain level of
precision in identifying vulnerable source code to provide proper assistance to address it.
Based on prototype implementation, a SQL-Injection vulnerability can be easily
eliminated if the corresponding vulnerable code is correctly identified. Therefore, a key
measure of the effectiveness of FindSecurityBugs is the measure of its ability to find
vulnerable code. The effectiveness of the interactive techniques to address those
vulnerabilities heavily depend on how the programmer responds to the warning and how
much detailed information can be provided.

3.3 FindSecurityBugs Detectors for Secure Android Software
Development
To suit the increasing demand for high quality information security professionals with
expertise in development process, we built innovative Android vulnerability
FindSecurityBugs detectors for the popular Android Studio IDE based on the on most
current OWASP 2017 mobile top 10 mobile security risks [18] in the category of SQL
injection, unintended data leakage, insecure communication, insecure data storage
vulnerability detectors. For example, the built detectors can recognize a vulnerability of
SQL injection and data leakage in an Android mobile application program, which may
face the threat of potential malicious code injection, and then issue a warning on the
code line. Following the provided options, students or developers can enforce a new
secure statement to replace the unsecure statement.
The detectors can be built with MAVEN then loaded into the Android Studio IDE,
parse Android java source code, identify specific API calls, warn the potential
vulnerabilities, recommend security solutions, and replace code statements. Once
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developers execute the analysis and click on the warning icon, secure coding prevention
and protection options will be shown in Android Studio. Following the provided options,
students or developers can enforce a new secure statement to replace the unsecure
statement.
To add a customized detector, usually there are five steps.
1. Creating vulnerable samples
First we need to create a sample class that contains the weakness which going to be
illustrated. Vulnerable sample are placed in find-sec bugs/plugin/src/test/java/testcode.
The code sample doesn't need to be a working application. We can write the minimum
code to trigger the rule. For example, this class is created to illustrate copy/paste buffer
caching with CopyPasteLeakageDetector class.

Figure 3.2 CopyPasteLeakageDetector class sample

2. Writing a test case
We can copy-paste the basic test structure from another test class. For example, here
is a test case which validates CopyPasteLeakage source code will trigger the
"ANDOID_COPYPASTE" vulnerability caution at line 25 (Actual number base on the
line number showed on your IDE).
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Figure 3.3 CopyPasteLeakageDetector test class

3. Configuration of the new detector
For this step, we need to register the detector and bug pattern in findbugs.xml file.
The class reference will soon be created.

Figure 3.4 Register detector and bug pattern

4. Description
We need to create the appropriate description in the messages.xml. You can leave
the Details tag node empty at this point and fill it later.
5. New detector class
There are many possibilities in order to implements a detector.


OpcodeStackDetector : Look for a specific method call



ConfiguredBasicInjectionDetector : To implement an injection-like detector



Detector : To analyze the complete class context

Here is a simple CopyPasteLeakageDetector example.
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Figure 3.5 CopyPasteLeakageDetector
Taint checks usually highlight specific security risks primarily associated with web
sites which are attacked using techniques, such as SQL injection or buffer overflow
attack approaches. For "injection-based" detectors, the system has a configurable list of
inputs which it considers producing "tainted" data. The system also has a configurable
list of "sinks" which should not be allowed to receive any tainted data. Sink file format is
composed of those info separated by the characters:
•Method signature
•Injectable parameter indexes in the reverse order (Order on the stack before the method
call)

3.4 SQL Injection Detectors
There are several types of SQL injection, consisting of direct insertion code to user
input variables and then concatenated with SQL statements to be executed or other less
direct code insertion technique. Some of them are listed as below:
1. Incorrectly filtered escape characters
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This form occurs if user input is passed to SQL statement without filtering escape
characters. Implementation is illustrated by following example.
“SELECT * FROM users WHERE username= ‘”+username+”’” in which the variable
username can be crafted by attackers, either by inputting an always true clause or by
commenting out the rest of query statement. What’s more, by inserting semicolon,
attackers are able to execute separate SQL statement in this case.
2. Incorrect type handling
This form of injection takes place when no appropriate type checking is performed.
The implementation of this form can be same as previous one. There are still many
forms to perform injection, the point that an injection works is by prematurely
terminating a text string and appending a new command.
Defense strategy for SQL injection
In addition to input validation to eliminate the malicious injection we also should use
secure parameterized query statements with placeholders to receive parameters instead
of embedding user input to query statement. Parameterized queries force the developer
to first define all the SQL code, and then pass in each parameter to the query later. This
coding style allows the database to distinguish between code and data, regardless of what
user input is supplied. This strategy will also solve the problem if there is not a type
handling mechanism, because a placeholder can only receive value of the given type.

Vulnerable code fragment:

Figure 3.6 Vulnerable code fragment

Secure parameterized query:
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Figure 3.7 Secure parameterized query pattern
Here is a sample vulnerable SQL injection code detected by the SQL injection detector
after scanning an Android app with the following snippet

Figure 3.8 Vulnerable SQL injection code fragment
A warning alert and solution hint is shown as follows:
Vulnerability alert! Use parametrized query with placeholders (“?”) to receive input
parameters instead of embedding user input to query statement with string
concatenation (“+”) to avoid malicious SQL injection.

Figure 3.9 Detector for Android SQL injection
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3.5 Other Android Vulnerability Detectors
Based on OWASP top 10 mobile risk report, we have developed more vulnerability
detectors with FindSecurityBugs for secure Android software development in the
categories of unintended data leakage, intent interception and spoofing, content
provider data sharing, input validation and output encoding. Here is a screen shot of a
diagnosis result by unintended data leakage detector for clipboard cache memory data
leakage.

Figure 3.10 Unintended data leakage detector
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The accuracy is crucial in the process of assessment because the primary requirement
for a SCA is accurate vulnerability Assessment testing.
A False Negative (FN) assessment overlooks vulnerability and fails to identify or
detect a serious security threat. SCA should be able to cover as much as security risks.
The False Positive (FP) (false alarm) assessment falsely identifies acceptable code as a
security flaw and notifies developer with an incorrect message of a security vulnerability,
which either misleads and confuses developers or results in an unnecessary development
delay. A good SCA tool should avoid both of them, but it is a challenge. Firstly, the forms
of vulnerabilities are changing and evolving all the time. Secondly, for a specific flaw
such as SQL injection, there are many different attack vectors. Thirdly, for a specific API
method invocation, some overloading calls are safe, but some others may make flaws.
Obviously you do not want any FN or FP. Clearly it is important for a solution to find
all real vulnerabilities. An inaccurate diagnosis can be more trouble than its worth.

Our project focuses on developing teaching and learning materials on secure mobile
software development with Android based hands-on labs. This effort will overcome the
shortage of hands-on learning materials of secure mobile software development, which
are essential in building capacity to secure mobile application development. Our project
with secure mobile software development Android Studio FindSecurityBugs plugin will
help students, faculty, and professionals to use and develop custom Android app
vulnerability detectors to increase and enhance their knowledge and skills in SMSD in a
real working environment.
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